03.01.01
Account management
Create, authorize, review, monitor, and disable accounts that can access systems containing specified information.
Use unique identities and authentication rules so every in-scope action can be tied back to the right person or process. This guide separates the formal control language from practical implementation, evidence, auditor questions, and related controls.
Official CPCSC Level 1 wording for 03.05.01. Use the Government of Canada page as the source of truth for certification or procurement submissions.
Contains information sourced from Government of Canada material used under the Open Government Licence - Canada.
Every user should have their own account. Shared logins make it hard to know who did what and make offboarding messy.
Re-authentication means users may need to prove who they are again when risk changes, such as after inactivity, privilege elevation, password reset, or sensitive system access.
For CPCSC Level 1, the useful test is not whether a policy mentions the control. The useful test is whether an owner can show the system setting, record, ticket, review output, or operating routine that proves the answer is true today and can be repeated when the next contract, customer, or assessment request arrives.
Use a central identity provider where possible, such as Microsoft Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta, or another managed identity platform.
Require unique named accounts for staff, contractors, admins, and service users. Avoid shared accounts unless the exception is documented and controlled.
Define password, SSO, session timeout, lock screen, and re-authentication requirements for in-scope systems.
Associate service accounts, automation accounts, scripts, and API tokens with an owner and purpose.
Use logs from the identity provider and key applications to support user activity and access investigations.
Identity provider user export.
Authentication policy or SSO configuration.
Password and session settings screenshots.
Service account inventory with owners.
Login and authentication logs.
Shared-account exception records.
Can every user action be tied to a unique identity?
Do any shared accounts exist, and how are they controlled?
When does the system require users to authenticate again?
Who owns service accounts and API tokens?
How do you investigate suspicious logins or account activity?