03.16.01
Security Engineering Principles
Apply security engineering principles to build security expectations into engineering, unsupported components, and external services for CPCSC Level 2 readiness.
Last updated June 25, 2026
Apply unsupported system components to build security expectations into engineering, unsupported components, and external services for CPCSC Level 2 readiness. This guide separates the official ITSP.10.171 control language from practical implementation, evidence, auditor questions, and related controls.
Official ITSP.10.171 wording for 03.16.02. Use the Cyber Centre publication and contract requirements as the source of truth for certification, assessment, or procurement submissions.
Contains information sourced from Government of Canada material used under the Open Government Licence - Canada.
Unsupported System Components is part of the CPCSC Level 2 System and services acquisition family. This is about building security into systems, purchases, unsupported technology decisions, and external service relationships before they become assessment problems.
For a founder, CISO, engineer, or compliance owner, the practical question is whether unsupported system components is visible in real operating evidence: a setting, workflow, ticket, log, approval, review, or exception record that can survive an external assessment.
Level 2 is different from Level 1 because the evidence has to survive an external assessment. A policy statement helps, but the stronger answer is a record that shows who did the work, when it ran, what system setting or workflow enforced it, and how exceptions were handled.
Define the in-scope systems, owners, users, vendors, and data flows affected by unsupported system components.
Apply secure engineering principles, manage unsupported components, define external service requirements, and include security requirements in procurement and vendor management.
Translate the formal requirement into one or two operating procedures: who performs it, how often, where it is recorded, and who approves exceptions.
Configure the relevant systems so the control is enforced by identity, endpoint, cloud, network, ticketing, monitoring, vendor, or documentation workflows rather than memory.
Keep evidence in a consistent folder, GRC system, ticket queue, or audit workspace so an assessor can trace the control from requirement to implementation to review.
Unsupported System Components: secure design reviews.
Unsupported System Components: unsupported component register.
Unsupported System Components: vendor security requirements.
Unsupported System Components: service agreements.
Unsupported System Components: architecture decision records.
Unsupported System Components: owner assignment and review cadence.
Unsupported System Components: exception, remediation, or POA&M records when the control is not fully implemented.
Where is unsupported system components implemented in the in-scope environment?
Who owns unsupported system components, and how do they know it is operating?
Show the evidence that proves unsupported system components ran during the assessment period.
What happens when unsupported system components fails, is bypassed, or has an exception?
How does this control connect to the system security plan, risk register, POA&M, and related CPCSC controls?
Formal control language is sourced from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security ITSP.10.171 publication. CPCSC Level 2 assessment context references the Government of Canada CPCSC program overview and ITSP.10.171-01 assessment guidance.
CPCSC Program OverviewITSP.10.171ITSP.10.171-01Open Government Licence - Canada