First SOC 2 program
A credible starting point
Allowlist a small set of low-risk tools, give each workflow a dedicated least-privilege identity, require confirmation for external effects, and document a kill switch.
AI / LLM Governance
AI/LLM workflows with tools, scripts, API calls, ticketing, firewall exports, or customer-impacting actions use least privilege, approval gates, and kill-switch controls.
Use this guide to put the control into operation, decide what records to retain, and check that an auditor can trace the evidence back to the work your team performed.
Maintained by GreenHat Security · Reviewed August 21, 2026
AI tools and actions are limited by enforceable permissions, approval gates, bounded parameters, and a tested way to stop execution.
First SOC 2 program
Allowlist a small set of low-risk tools, give each workflow a dedicated least-privilege identity, require confirmation for external effects, and document a kill switch.
As the company scales
Centralize tool policy, separate read from write capability, use risk-based action gates, rate and spend limits, runtime monitoring, and scheduled shutdown tests.
List every API, script, ticket, message, export, infrastructure operation, and customer-affecting action available to each workflow.
You should end up with: Workflow-to-tool permission matrix
Use dedicated identities, narrow scopes, parameter validation, destination allowlists, quotas, and short-lived credentials; log only normalized, redacted parameter metadata, never secret values or unnecessary customer payload content.
You should end up with: Least-privilege tool configuration
Require attributable approval before destructive, privileged, external, or customer-impacting execution, using normalized, redacted parameter metadata sufficient to show the action's scope and effect without exposing secret values or unnecessary payload content.
You should end up with: Action gate and approval record
Exercise the kill switch, credential revocation, queue cancellation, and recovery process without relying on the model to cooperate.
You should end up with: Dated kill-switch test and follow-up actions
Build the evidence set in three layers: what defines the control, who approved or reviewed it, and what proves it operated. Collect operating records when the work happens so they remain dated, attributable, correctly scoped, and traceable to the underlying activity.
Before sharing, remove unrelated personal or customer data, never expose passwords, tokens, or secret values, preserve enough source context to authenticate the record, and use the secure exchange approved for the engagement.
Documents that define the control, its scope, ownership, and expected way of working.
Confirm what the record proves
Each workflow's runtime identity is limited to approved tools, actions, resources, parameter rules, and environments.
Include this context
Workflow ID
Include this context
Runtime identity
Include this context
Tool or API
Include this context
Allowed actions
Include this context
Resource scope
Include this context
Approval owner
Weak evidence to avoid
A list of tool names with no identities, action scopes, resources, environments, or owner approval.
Dated proof that the control actually ran, such as tickets, logs, settings, exports, reports, and test results.
Confirm what the record proves
Consequential runtime actions cannot execute until the required reviewer approves a normalized, redacted description of the exact action, parameter scope, and intended effect; the retained record excludes secret values and unnecessary customer payload content.
Include this context
Gate ID
Include this context
Action and normalized, redacted parameter metadata that excludes secret values and unnecessary payload content
Include this context
Execution ID
Include this context
Required reviewer role
Include this context
Decision and time
Include this context
Execution disposition
Weak evidence to avoid
A user-interface confirmation screen without an attributable decision, an enforceable backend gate, or safe parameter metadata tied to the intended effect.
Confirm what the record proves
Operators can stop new and queued actions, revoke execution authority, verify shutdown, and recover deliberately.
Include this context
Test date
Include this context
Workflow and environment
Include this context
Initiating operator
Include this context
Shutdown steps
Include this context
Observed result and timing
Include this context
Follow-up actions
Weak evidence to avoid
A written stop procedure that has never been exercised and does not address queues or active credentials.
Confirm what the record proves
Runtime tool calls and customer-impacting actions are attributable to a workflow version and show authorization, approval, normalized and redacted parameter metadata, and outcome without retaining secret values or unnecessary customer payload content.
Include this context
Execution and action IDs
Include this context
Workflow version
Include this context
Tool and normalized, redacted parameter metadata that excludes secret values and unnecessary payload content
Include this context
Runtime identity
Include this context
Approval reference
Include this context
Timestamp and result
Weak evidence to avoid
A count of agent actions without individual execution IDs, safe parameter metadata, approvals, identities, or outcomes.
Type 1
Retain current tool permissions and action-gate configuration plus a normalized, redacted audit record for one recent approved execution and the latest successful kill-switch test as of the selected date; exclude secret values and unnecessary customer payload content.
Type 2
Export a normalized, redacted audit record for every runtime tool invocation and proposed external action during the period, including allowed, denied, approval-pending, rejected, failed, retried, cancelled, and emergency-stopped events, plus every tool-permission change and kill-switch test; exclude secret values and unnecessary customer payload content from the export.
Reconcile normalized runtime tool-request records to gateway and target-system event identifiers, approval decisions, and permission history; verify denied and unapproved calls did not execute and every scheduled kill-switch test is present. Perform the reconciliation without copying secret values or unnecessary customer payload content into retained evidence.
Use this checklist to prepare for procedures an auditor may perform. The exact steps and sample selection depend on your engagement scope and the service auditor's professional judgment.
Determine whether the control is designed to achieve this result: AI tools and actions are limited by enforceable permissions, approval gates, bounded parameters, and a tested way to stop execution.
Compare the documented owner with the intended role (AI Workflow Owner / CISO / Engineering), then compare dated records with the stated cadence: Per workflow/change; review at least annually.
Reconcile normalized runtime tool-request records to gateway and target-system event identifiers, approval decisions, and permission history; verify denied and unapproved calls did not execute and every scheduled kill-switch test is present. Perform the reconciliation without copying secret values or unnecessary customer payload content into retained evidence.
Retain current tool permissions and action-gate configuration plus a normalized, redacted audit record for one recent approved execution and the latest successful kill-switch test as of the selected date; exclude secret values and unnecessary customer payload content.
Export a normalized, redacted audit record for every runtime tool invocation and proposed external action during the period, including allowed, denied, approval-pending, rejected, failed, retried, cancelled, and emergency-stopped events, plus every tool-permission change and kill-switch test; exclude secret values and unnecessary customer payload content from the export.
Documents that define the control, its scope, ownership, and expected way of working.
For each selected record, confirm it demonstrates Each workflow's runtime identity is limited to approved tools, actions, resources, parameter rules, and environments.
Dated proof that the control actually ran, such as tickets, logs, settings, exports, reports, and test results.
For each selected record, confirm it demonstrates Consequential runtime actions cannot execute until the required reviewer approves a normalized, redacted description of the exact action, parameter scope, and intended effect; the retained record excludes secret values and unnecessary customer payload content.
For each selected record, confirm it demonstrates Operators can stop new and queued actions, revoke execution authority, verify shutdown, and recover deliberately.
For each selected record, confirm it demonstrates Runtime tool calls and customer-impacting actions are attributable to a workflow version and show authorization, approval, normalized and redacted parameter metadata, and outcome without retaining secret values or unnecessary customer payload content.
Use the categories that apply to this control: connect any policy or design artifact to its approval or review record, then trace a selected operating record through execution, result, and any exception or remediation.
These identifiers help you navigate related Trust Services Criteria. They do not reproduce the criteria or prove that this control fully addresses them in your environment.
Confirm final scope, mappings, and testing expectations with your service auditor. SOC 2® is an AICPA trademark; GreenHat Security is not affiliated with or endorsed by AICPA.